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David Z. Saltz 
A confession: since the beginning of my professional career as a scholar, I 
have led a double life. My PhD and academic appointments have been in theatre. 
I regularly participate in conferences for organizations such as ATHE, ASTR, and 
Performance Studies International, and I publish much of my work in books and 
journals directed primarily toward theatre and performance scholars, such as JDTC. 
Yet I have also presented a number of papers at meetings of the American Society 
for Aesthetics and published a series of essays in that organization's journal, the 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. The ASA and the readership of JAAC 
consist almost entirely of people who work in American philosophy departments. 
Moreover, most, though not all, of these philosophers fall squarely within the Anglo-
American "analytic" tradition—one of the few major theoretical paradigms almost 
entirely absent from the discourse of contemporary theatre and performance theory 
and criticism. 
In announcing my affinity toward analytic philosophy to an audience consisting 
mostly of theatre and performance scholars, I feel a bit like I am outing myself. I 
get a similar feeling when, after I deliver a talk at an aesthetics conference, someone 
expresses surprise upon discovering that I am from a theatre department; I am 
always a bit embarrassed and, at the same time, proud that I have "passed." 
Norms and Expectations 
Over the years, I have become accustomed to adopting quite different ways 
of speaking and writing depending on whether my audience consists of theatre 
scholars or philosophers. I have internalized the standards of my two worlds of 
discourse. Still, whichever community I am addressing, I always regard myself 
primarily as a "theorist," as opposed, say, to being a critic or historian. Indeed, I 
think of my work for theatre scholars and for philosophers as two aspects of a 
single project. The duality of my identity as a theorist ultimately serves me very 
well. Each community compels me to be rigorous in very different ways. 
The papers I produce for theatre conferences and journals typically lavish 
much more attention on specific dramatic texts or performances than papers I 
produce for philosophers. Interestingly, these papers also tend to contain many 
more allusions to, and quotes from,* other theorists. By contrast, the papers I write 
for philosophical audiences focus in much greater depth on the original argument 
that I am developing. In fact, quite often a hypothetical example—what philosophers 
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call a "thought experiment"—will serve my purposes just as effectively as an 
example from an actual play or performance. 
In a nutshell, my papers for theatre scholars use theory to elucidate specific 
cases. The emphasis is on the critical, cultural and historical applications and 
implications of a theoretical position. My papers for philosophers, on the other 
hand, focus on the theoretical position itself. I devote the bulk of my energy to 
building the strongest possible case for the position that I am advocating and against 
alternate positions. One of the most crucial and difficult parts of this task is simply 
articulating all the positions involved as clearly and unambiguously as possible, 
and identifying the philosophical presuppositions that underlie those positions. 
The examples I adduce from particular plays and performance serve as case studies, 
not as ends unto themselves. 
From my own perspective, these different emphases complement each other 
very well. I find myself fleshing out the introduction and conclusion of my 
arguments for theatre scholars, but rushing through the arguments themselves in a 
sentence or two. For philosophers I do exactly the opposite. If I were to present an 
ASTR paper at the American Society for Aesthetics, I suspect that the paper would 
strike most philosophers in the audience as lacking in substance. But the same, I 
suspect, would be true if I presented an ASA paper at ASTR. The response of many 
philosophers to the ASTR paper would be: "You've made some intriguing claims, 
but why should I believe you, or, for that matter, the various other theorists you 
quote with approval? Prove it\" On the other hand, the response of many theatre 
scholars to an ASA paper would be: "Why should I care about any of this hair-
splitting analysis? Get to the point already!" 
A Bum Rap 
The "theory" practiced by most American philosophers is worlds apart from 
he "theory" practiced by most scholars in American theatre and performance studies 
departments. That is to say, the two groups of theorists occupy two distinct universes 
of discourse. There is very little overlap between the theoretical texts upon which 
these theorists draw and to which they respond. Of course, there are a few cross-
over figures, such as J.L. Austin and, to a lesser extent, Wittgenstein. Virtually 
never, however, will theatre or performance theory refer to seminal philosophers 
such as Willard Quine, Hilary Putman, Donald Davidson or Winfird Sellars. 
Even more surprising, theatre and performance scholars remain almost entirely 
oblivious to luminaries in the analytic tradition of philosophical aesthetics, many 
of whom have put forth theories with clear application to theatre, such as Richard 
Wollheim, Nelson Goodman, Jerrold Levinson, Joseph Margolis, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Kendall Walton, and even Noel Carroll. (A partial exception is Arthur 
Danto, who since he has started slumming as an art critic has gained substantial 
recognition outside of the world of philosophy, though primarily among visual art 
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theorists rather than performance theorists.) 
American theatre and performance theorists are not simply unaware of the 
work being done by Anglo-American philosophers. They tend to react to the very 
idea of analytic philosophy with distaste. For some time, it has been very uncool to 
admit that one is working in the analytic tradition. Scholars in American theatre 
and performance studies departments are far more comfortable looking to the 
continent for philosophical insight and inspiration than to work being done by 
philosophers on their very own campuses. 
Why? No doubt, a large part of the answer derives from the institutional politics 
of the American university, and to the alliances that have formed between disciplines 
such as theatre and, for example, comparative literature. This cultural history of 
American theatre scholarship is a ripe area for investigation, but I will not pursue 
that issue here. 
The divide goes deeper than institutional politics. Many performance theorists 
have legitimate qualms about the nature of the work analytic philosophers undertake. 
They think of the style of analytic philosophy as overly technical, dry and boring, 
and the arguments themselves as overly "positivistic" and ahistorical. These 
concerns are not entirely unfounded, but they are based on partial and mostly 
outdated impressions. 
The variety of the work being conducted today under the general rubric of 
analytic philosophy is truly remarkable, much greater even than the tremendous 
diversity of style and approach one finds in theatre and performance theory. A lot 
of that work really is boring (as, for that matter, is much performance theory). But 
no theorist is more engaging than, for example, the respected philosopher Ted 
Cohen, whose recent book on the philosophy of jokes is a riot. Some analytic 
philosophers still do reduce complex ideas to the technical language of symbolic 
logic. But that approach is much less common in the philosophy of art than some 
other areas, and the philosophers who have a particularly strong penchant for dry 
and technical jargon often get a hard time from those who do not. 
Stanley Cavell is a philosopher with a dense, literate style akin to Herbert 
Blau's. Today, the accusation of "positivism" is almost as damning within the world 
of Anglo-American philosophy as it is in performance theory. The Anglo-American 
tradition underwent a "linguistic turn," and more recently a "cultural turn," much 
as the continental tradition did, and the critique of ahistoricism entered the 
philosophical discourse even earlier than the discourse of theatre theory. 
Philosophers tend not to flock toward any kind of unified party line, but most 
American philosophers today share an instinctual aversion to essentialism and 
ahistoricism. An analytic philosopher such as Joseph Margolis stakes out positions 
on issues such as the ontology of cultural entities and the relativism of interpretation 
that even many performance theorists would reject as too radical. 
Misconceptions are especially abundant concerning the field of philosophical 
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aesthetics. Many performance theorists imagine that philosophers of art preoccupy 
themselves with defining abstract notions such as beauty and the sublime, and 
only take into account a classical canon of Western, white, male artists. To a large 
extent, that used to be the case (though there have always been important 
exceptions)—at a time when theatre theory was characterized by similar biases 
and limitations, that is, through approximately the late 1960s. But changing cultural 
tides break on the shores of American philosophy departments much as they do in 
the rest of the academy. To be sure, articles in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism still refer to Beethoven, but also to jazz and rock; to Vermeer, but also to 
Jeff Koons and Martha Stewart. 
Philosophy as Dialogue 
What, then, is analytic philosophy? Naturally, analytic philosophers themselves 
have reflected on that question and proposed a range of different answers. The 
question is, after all, a fundamentally philosophical one. Qualities that philosophers 
themselves often emphasize are clarity and rigor of argument, and deep and patient 
probing of concepts and presuppositions. Most generally, however, the quality that 
makes the discipline particularly attractive to me is its peculiarly dialogic, one 
might even say dramatic, methodology. 
Analytic philosophy began as rejection of an Hegelian approach to theory, an 
approach that still dominates continental philosophy. One of the basic impulses 
underlying the analytic tradition is a healthy suspicion of grand unifying theories 
and sweeping metaphysical statements. This impulse has much in common with 
what would only much later be termed postmodernism, at least in Lyotard's sense 
of the postmodern: it is predicated on a profound skepticism toward meta narratives. 
Analytic philosophers tend to argue in short, highly focused spurts. One 
philosopher will advance a proposition. Another will pick that proposition apart 
and either revise and refine it, or propose a radically different proposition in its 
stead. The first philosopher may then rebut the analysis of the second, or may 
accept the counter-arguments and go further in the new direction, or accept the 
counter-arguments but reject the conclusions the second philosopher drew from 
those counter arguments and propose yet another solution. A third philosopher 
might then join in and argue that the entire debate rests on faulty premises, and 
propose an entirely new approach to the topic. 
Theorists in performance and theatre tend to regard criticisms as attacks. By 
contrast, analytic philosophers tend to welcome trenchant, detailed criticisms of 
their positions. The philosophers with whom you disagree are often much more 
useful to you than those with whom you agree, and the more powerful and cogent 
an argument is in opposition to your view, the more helpful that argument is in 
helping you to clarify and refine your own position. If other philosophers 
immediately and unconditionally accept a philosophical argument, that argument 
is probably trivial and makes no significant contribution to the discourse. The 
most valuable works of philosophy are those that challenge other philosophers to 
respond—even if the response is diametrically opposed to the argument that 
provoked it. 
Individual works of analytic philosophy typically assume a dramatic form 
internally as well. A typical approach is for a philosopher to begin by formulating 
a position and then to respond with counter-arguments to that proposal. The best 
philosophy does not rush to conclusions—which can be very frustrating for non-
philosophers who are not acclimated to the game. Moreover, after all of the twists 
and turns of argument, the conclusion that emerges may not seem very impressive 
in and of itself. It might seem intuitive and obvious. The significance of many 
philosophical positions only becomes clear when you put that position in context 
of the discourse. Often the position ultimately espoused matters less than the ones 
rejected along the way. Philosophical arguments often reveal propositions with a 
deep intuitive appeal to be deeply flawed or incoherent, or to have unexpected and 
unwelcome implications. 
Theory as practiced in theatre and performance scholarship, by contrast, tends 
to put great stock in the apparent profundity of conclusions, and much less stock in 
the quality of the arguments advanced in support of those conclusions. Consequently, 
counter-intuitive conclusions are highly seductive. Paradox, in particular, is a 
positive virtue in much performance theory. An argument that results in a paradox 
is not rejected as incoherent but celebrated as profound. "X both is and is not Y" is 
a deeply satisfying formulation. For example, Richard Scheduler's description of 
the actor's identity in performance as combining the "not I" and the "not not I" has 
become a favorite formula among performance theorists for explaining the status 
of acting. While I agree that Scheduler's formulation is important and useful, I 
would suggest that its value lies precisely in the way it identifies a conceptual 
roadblock in our current thinking about the actor's identity, and points to a 
fundamental issue in performance theory that cries out for rigorous philosophical 
interrogation. Analytic philosophers seek out paradoxes in order to reveal a logical 
flaw in an argument, or, even more usefully, to identify a knotty conceptual problem 
in need of intensive philosophical scrutiny; for example, a landmark moment in 
the early history of analytic philosophy was Russell's revelation of a paradox in 
Frege's foundation of mathematics. 
"Using" Theory versus "'Doing" Theory 
The difference between the theory produced by philosophers and by 
performance theorists runs much deeper than the question of which other theorists 
one reads and cites. It extends beyond the distinction between analytic and 
continental philosophy, a distinction that in any case is far less decisive than it is 
often supposed to be. (An analytic philosopher will often have more in common 
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with certain continental philosophers than certain other analytic philosophers.) On 
a very general level, philosophers and performance theorists tend to conceive of 
the theoretical enterprise in very different ways. Performance theorists typically 
apply theories developed by scholars in other disciplines, such as philosophy. In 
the halls between sessions of an ASTR or ATHE conference one might hear theorists 
asking one another (as a prominent performance scholar recently asked me): "who 
are you using these days?" "Judith Butler," might come the reply; "I'm looking at 
the performativity of ethnicity in reality television. And you? Are you still working 
with Baudrillard?" "No, I've moved beyond him. Lately I 've started using 
Bourdieu." 
All too often in performance and theatre theory, we argue by citation. Theories 
are collages constructed from quotes and ideas extracted from other texts. If someone 
we respect has published a theoretical assertion that sounds good and supports our 
own position, we uncritically adopt and apply the assertion. Too many arguments 
in theatre and performance theory stake their validity on phrases such as: "as so-
and-so has demonstrated/taught us/revealed...." Because performance theory very 
rarely advances original arguments in support of the philosophical principles it 
adopts — indeed, it too rarely even rehearses the arguments offered by the theorists 
who originally advanced those positions—we are often merely theoretical parasites: 
the flow of theoretical discourse goes almost exclusively into performance theory, 
and very rarely does it come out again to influence other disciplines. 
It is time for performance and theatre theorists to emerge from the shadows 
and become full fledged players in the interdisciplinary drama of theoretical 
discourse. To do so, however, we must finally take full responsibility for the positions 
we stake out and the theoretical assumptions upon which those positions are 
constructed. 
